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RECENT CASE NOTES
in the present case, even when judged by a standard of reasonable care, is
probably correct,1 5 it is submitted that the liability formula of the court is
unfortunate, and not in accordance with authority. The only conceivable
basis upon which the liability formula of the court can be justified, is to
make the failure of the railroad to take account of the habitual trespassers
strong evidence of willful and wanton misconduct,16 and this the court showed
no inclination to do. C. B. D.
TORTS-PROXIMATE CAUSE-INTERVENING CAUSE.-In violation of a city
ordinance a construction company obstructed the street and sidewalk in front
of property upon which it was building a garage. While plantiff's intestate
.was walking into the street to get around the obstruction, she was struck
by an automobile. Plaintiff, as administratrix, sues the city, the construction
company, and the property owner alleging negligence in allowing the obstruct-
ing of the public way. Held: The negligence of the defendants was not the
proximate cause of the injury. City of Gary et al v. Struble (Ind. App.
1939), 18 N. E. (2d) 465.
Negligence is the creation of an unreasonable risk toward a particular
class of persons in respect to certain types of harm.1 Such a tortious act
may bring many harmful consequences, but the law as a matter of policy
holds the actor accountable for only a few; the rest of the harms, being too
remote, are said not to be the proximate result of the act. In drawing the line
between proximate and remote consequences, one must scrutinize not only the
consequences themselves, but also the character of the conduct to determine
toward whom the defendant is negligent. There is a clash of opinion as to
whether attention should be focused primarily on the extent of the risk created
or on the nature of the resulting harms, but it is to be noted that the difference
is only one of analysis. 2
15 The appellant admitted making sure that he was unobserved before
mounting the cars. The train was moved only at a slow rate of speed, and
it is difficult to see how merely bringing the train to a halt could amount
to negligent operation, or failure to exercise due care. To impose a duty
of giving warning before stopping the train under such circumstances would
seem clearly unreasonable.
16The results obtained by such a rule would be more harsh than under
a standard of reasonable care. At least one Indiana case has apparently
reached its result in this manner. The facts are not analagous to the present
case, and the court was dealing with what might have been an "attractive
nuisance" situation. Penso v. McCormick (1890), 125 Ind. 116, 25 N. E.
156, 9 L. R. A. 313, 21 Am. St. 211.
1 Restatement, Torts (1934), §§ 281-2.
2Those emphasizing the character of the conduct to see the scope of the
risk created leave only the question of cause in fact to be determined by
looking to the consequences. Advocates of this view include Leon Green,
Rationale of Proximate Cause, (1927) ; and Cardozo, J. in Palsgraf v. Long
Island R. Co. (1928), 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99.
Proponents of the consequences test look to the conduct only to see if
there is any unreasonable risk created toward anyone without regard to the
class of persons or type of harm. This "negligence in the air" view was
advocated by Andrews, J. dissenting in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co.
(1928), 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99. Ths test throws more of a load on the
INDIANA LAWV JOURNAL
Determining the extent of the duty in the present case by an interpretation
of the ordinance against obstructions of public ways, 3 it is obvious that the
risks sought to be prevented are those of harms from contacts of travellers
with the obstructions themselves and from contacts between pedestrians and
vehicles. The harm to decedent traveller was precisely of that type which
the ordinance was enacted to prevent. The defendants' breach of the standard
of conduct set down by the enactment was negligence per se.
The court correctly assumes that the defendants were negligent, but it
fails to determine toward what class of persons and in respect to what type
of harms the risk was created.4 After thus slighting the negligence concept,
the court devotes its entire opinion to the nature of the consequences of the
defendants' act.
The failure to analyze the extent of risk created, although out of line with
modern methods, is not necessarily objectionable; but the court showed a
similar oversight of well accepted principles in its examination of the conse-
quences of the negligent act. In the opinion, attention is centered on the fact
that there was a moving physical force which intervened between the de-
fendants' negligence and the injury. The court states, "The . . . obstruc-
tions in the street and the driving of the automobile against decedent were
not 'both present and active in the result.'" This declaration implies that to
be the proximate cause, the act of defendants must create a motion or establish
a condition which is physically connected to the force that does the harm;
hence since the obstructions themselves did not directly injure the decedent,
there was no liability regardless of the fact that the obstructions guided the
colliding bodies into greater proximity.
jury since the main issue is whether the injury to plaintiff was reasonably
foreseeable to the negligent actor.
A middle-of-the-road method is one whereby both the ambit of the risk
and the nature of the consequences are examined with equal ardor. The
problem of determining liability is broken down into a series of steps that
facilitate judgment. Followers of this view include Harper, Law of Torts,
(1933), §§107-129; Bohlen, Studies in The Law of Tort (1926), Chapter
1, pp. 1-32, also found in 40 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 79, 148, (1901); Restate-
ment, Torts (1934), §§ 430-462.
For a review of the various methods of analysis see Harper, Liability
Without Fault and Proximate Cause, (1932), 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1001; and
Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, (Jan., 1939), 39 Col. L.
Rev. 20, 52 Harvard L. Rev. 372, 48 Yale L. JI. 390. Mr. Seavey describes
the Restatement of Torts' solution thus: "Perhaps to provide a transition
period in which the courts might use either approach, the Restatement of Torts,
first adopting to the full the theory of risk (§281), at a later stage recants
and presents a confusing series of superseding causes (§§ 440-442) which may
cut off liability. The courts, like the Restatement, have frequently tried to
ride two horses, but I have faith that the simplicity, logic and justice of the
approach made prominent by Cardozo will ultimately prevail." 39 Col. L.
Rev. 20, 38; 52 Harv. L. Rev. 372, 390; 48 Yale L. JI. 390, 408.
3 From the statement of the facts by the court, it is inferred that the
ordinance was of the usual type which prohibits the obstruction of streets
and sidewalks so as to restrict freedom of safe passage of travellers.
4The court uses the "negligence in the air" concept as elucidated by
Andrews, J. dissenting in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co. (1928), 248 N. Y.
339, 162 N. E. 99.
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The court asks, ". . was there some new and independent cause inter-
vening between the wrong and the injury?" Of course there was an interven-
ing force, but was it a superseding cause which cut off the defendants' lia-
bility? Without proceeding to see if the new and independent force was
foreseeable, natural, or probable, the court concluded, "Having applied 'every
day judgment as men' . . ., We conclude that the alleged negligence
in permitting the street to be obstructed as alleged, was not such a delinquency
which ought justly be held the efficient cause of decedent's alleged in-
juries. . .. "5
While centering its attention exclusively on the relatively simple problem
of determining what physical force inflicted the decedent's injury, the court
ignored a settled rule which has been well stated and adhered to in prior
Indiana cases. This principle, almost universally accepted and applied, is
that if the act or force immediately causing the harm might reasonably have
been anticipated as a harmful, intervening agency, it will not be a super-
seding cause; thus the original act of negligence will be regarded as the
proximate cause of the injury, notwithstanding the intervention.8
The present case, especially when considered in the light of a similar
recent decision,7 shows that the court has taken a definite step away from
the accepted rule of causation. In these cases the court has indicated that
it is following the previous Indiana decisions on the proximate cause issue;
however, in both it has inexplicably omitted the basic principle stressed in
those precedent cases that if the intervening force is reasonably foreseeable,
it will not be a superseding legal cause.
By ignoring the modern negligence concept which calls for a determina-
tion of the actor's duty in order to see toward what class of persons and in
respect to what type of harms the unreasonable risk is created, and by omitting
the heretofore accepted foreseeability rule for determining whether an inter-
vening force is a superseding cause, it is submitted that the Appellate Court
has taken a step away from the better line of legal thought.
L. N. M.
5 The quotations are taken by the court from Sarber v. City of Indianapolis
(1919), 72 Ind. App. 594, 126 N. E. 330. Although quoting extensively from
this case, the court ominously omits the part pertaining to the foreseeability
of the intervening force.
6 For an early elucidation of the rule as to foreseeability of intervening
cause see Biliman v. The Indianapolis, Cinc., and Lafayete R. Co. (1881),
76 Ind. 166. Cases directly on the rule are Binford v. Johnson (1882), 82 Ind.
426, 42 Am. Rp. 508; Clv., C. C., and St. L. R. Co. v. Clark (1912), 51 Ind.
App. 392, 97 N. E. 882; Drew v. Lett (1932), 95 Ind. App. 89, 182 N. E. 547;
Opple v. Ray (1935), 208 Ind. 450, 195 N. E. 81. Well stated dicta are found in
Nickey v. Steuder (1904), 164 Ind. 189, 73 N. E. 117, and Engle v. Director
General of Ry's. (1921), 78 Ind. App. 547, 133 N. E. 138.
Innocent, negligent, and even deliberate criminal acts of intervening actors
have been held not to be superseding causes where the original wrongdoer
should have anticipated the intervening act. Turner v. Page (1904), 186
Mass. 600, 72 N. E. 329; Wagner v. International R. Co. (1921), 232 N.
Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437, 19 A. L. R. 1; Brower v. N. Y. Cent. and H.
R. Co. (1918), 91 N. J. L. 190, 103 A. 166, 1 A. L. R. 734; Hines v. Gar-
rett (1921), 131 Va. 125, 108 S. E. 690. For intervening forces generally
see Harper, The Law of Torts, (1933), §§ 111-128
7 Wilcox v. Urshel (1936), 101 Ind. App. 627, 200 N. E. 465.
